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CHOCCOSUISEE – THE NEW 
'EXTENDED EXTENDED' PASSING 
OFF 
Katharine Saunders* 
This paper analyses the recent British passing off case Chocosuisse.  The paper attempts to set 
out the historical nature of passing off and then analyse the developments in Chocosuisse in light 
of the historical origins of the tort.  The relationship between tort and equity is discussed, with 
particular attention paid to the 'fusion' debate.  The acceptance of an 'unclean hands' defence in 
Chocosuisse and its appropriateness is discussed.  The author proposes alternative means of 
achieving similar goals that are more consistent with both passing off's origins and the relationship 
between tort and equity.  The new Chocosuisse requirements for extended passing off goodwill are 
discussed.  The author considers potential problems that the new requirements will create for 
extended passing off in and urges future courts not to follow this aspect of Chocosuisse.  Finally 
Laddie J's use of passing off to protect correct application of geographical indicators and the 
inconsistency of this use with the origins of passing off are discussed.  The author considers 
alternative means available to protect accurate application of geographical indicators. 
I INTRODUCTION 
During last century the law of passing off was developed extensively to meet the needs 
of the modern commercial environment. The origins of passing off protection formed the 
basis for these developments however recently the British courts have pushed the 
boundaries of passing off beyond its origins. This may signal the end of passing off as we 
know it. 
Passing off originally protected trade names as badges of origin, that is a link to the 
source of the goods. Passing off provides a remedy against a trader who deceives the 
plaintiff trader's customers into believing that his (her) goods are the plaintiff's goods. To 
succeed in an action for passing off the plaintiff must prove three elements. First, that the 
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plaintiff possesses goodwill, second that there is misrepresentation by the defendant that is 
likely to deceive the public and third that the plaintiff has suffered, or is likely to suffer, 
damage as a result of that misrepresentation.1 
Over time protection was extended beyond protection of a badge of origin.2 Traders 
can now prevent their rivals from imputing a connection between their products by use of 
a mark, name or get-up.3 Traditionally the courts were careful not to extend protection to 
descriptive or geographical terms because passing off affords the successful plaintiff 
monopoly rights in the particular mark, name or get up.4 Thus to provide protection for 
descriptive or geographical terms would remove them from the general lexicon. 
The landmark passing off case J Bollinger v The Costa Brava Wine Co Ltd (No 1) and (No 
2)5 (Spanish Champagne) created 'extended passing off'.  This enables a class of traders to 
prevent rivals from incorrectly applying descriptive terms. While the class cannot prevent 
rivals applying the term correctly, they can prevent its incorrect application. Other cases 
about products made in geographical areas followed, for example Scotch Blended 
Whiskey,6 and Spanish Sherry.7 It was widely believed that extended passing off required 
the plaintiff to prove that consumers associated the disputed term with a particular 
location.8 
In Erwen Warnick B V v J Townend & Sons9 (Advocaat) the House of Lords dispelled that 
popular conception by preventing incorrect application of the descriptive term 'Advocaat', 
which was associated with specific ingredients rather than a geographical location. Thus 
  
1  Reckitt & Coleman Products Ltd v Borden Inc and Others [1990] All ER 873, 880 (HL) per Lord Oliver 
[Jiff Lemon]. 
2  Stephen Todd The Law of Torts in New Zealand (2 ed, Brookers, Wellington, 1997) 756. 
3  Halsbury's Laws of England (4 ed, Butterworths, London, 1995) vol 48, Trade Marks and Trade 
Names, para 167, 99. 
4  Hornsby Building Information Centre Pty Ltd v Sydney Building Information Centre Ltd (1978) 140 CLR 
216, 229 per Stephen J. 
5  J Bollinger v The Costa Brava Wine Co Ltd (No 1) [1960] Ch 262 and (No 2) [1961] 1 WLR 277 and 
[1961] RPC 116 [Spanish Champagne]. 
6  John Walker & Sons Ltd v Henry Ost & Co Ltd [1970] 2 All ER 106, [1970] 1 WLR 917, [1970] RPC 489. 
7  Vine Products Ltd v Mackenzie & Co Ltd [1969] RPC 1. 
8  Erwen Warnick B V v J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd [1978] FSR 473 (CA); James General Principles of 
the Law of Torts (4 ed, Butterworths, London 1978) 323; Halsbury's Laws of England, above n 3, para 
185, 114. 
9  Erwen Warnick B V v J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd [1979] AC 731, 742 (HL) [Advocaat]. 
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extended passing off protects use of a descriptive term associated with a distinctive and 
recognisable product; geographical association is not required. 
Recently in the British case Chocosuisse Union des Fabricants Suisses de Chocolat and Ors v 
Cadbury Ltd (Chocosuisse),10 the boundaries of passing off have been pushed even further 
beyond their traditional limits. This paper considers the aspects of Laddie J's judgment in 
the High Court which potentially further extend the tort of extended passing off.  
First, the origins of the tort of passing off and its development to pre-Chocosuisse 
extended passing off are discussed. The origins of passing off must be considered when 
developing passing off because logically any extension must be consistent with those 
origins as they define the limitations of its development.  
Second, Laddie J's use of the equitable clean hands maxim is considered. The 
traditional distinctions between equity and the common law and the recent developments 
of their relationship are discussed. Laddie J's application of the clean hands maxim to 
making out the cause of action and to the grant of both equitable and legal remedies is 
inconsistent with the traditional distinction between law and equity. It is argued that there 
are more appropriate methods of applying the concepts underlying the clean hands maxim 
to the tort of passing off. 
Third, Laddie J's definition of goodwill is discussed. Traditionally extended passing off 
required goodwill associated with a reputation for recognisable and distinctive qualities. 
Laddie J defined goodwill inconsistently with traditional requirements in a manner which 
has potential to further extend extended passing off. It is argued that this definition is 
unjustified and that it will potentially impact negatively on the efficacy of extended 
passing off. 
Fourth, Laddie J appears to use passing off to protect geographical indicators. This is 
not the traditional sphere of passing off and is inconsistent with its origins. Under the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights11 (TRIPs), World 
Trade Organisation12 (WTO) member countries are required to provide measures to 
  
10  Chocosuisse Union des Fabricants Suisses de Chocolat and Ors v Cadbury Ltd (1998) 41 IPR 1 (HC) 
[Chocosuisse]; Chocosuisse Union des Fabricants Suisses de Chocolat v Cadbury Ltd [1999] RPC 826 (CA) 
[Chocosuisse (CA)]. 
11  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1 C of the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation 1994 [TRIPs]. The World Trade 
Organisation's TRIPs is an attempt to narrow the gaps in the way that intellectual property rights 
are protected around the world and to bring them under a common international rules. 
12  World Trade Organisation [WTO], established by the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organisation 1994.  
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enable interested parties to protect geographical indicators. The United Kingdom has not 
yet complied with this obligation. It is argued that passing off is neither the appropriate 
method to provide such protection nor to enforce the obligation to do so. The alternative 
course for enforcement of the TRIPs obligation was for Switzerland to take a dispute to the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body over the United Kingdom's breach of its obligations under 
TRIPs. The method of taking a dispute and the reasons why one was not taken are 
discussed. 
II THE TORT OF PASSING OFF 
A The Origins of Passing Off 
While the exact origins of passing off are unclear it was recognised at common law as 
early as the reign of Elizabeth I.13 There is evidence of passing off cases in both the Courts 
of Law and the Courts of Equity.14 Common law passing off was a purely personal right, 
based on fraud.15 If fraud was proved the common law remedy of damages would be 
granted. Equitable passing off was based on protection of a property right.16 Thus fraud 
was not required to make out an action for equitable passing off; a remedy would be 
available even in cases of 'innocent' passing off.17 'Innocent' passing off occurs when there 
is no intention to deceive. The equitable remedy was an injunction.  
The fusion of equity and the law18 means that fraud is no longer required for passing 
off; the action is now based on a property right.19 Fusion also means that both equitable 
and common law remedies are available for passing off.20 
Passing off is now categorised as a tort by authoritative scholars.21 It is important to 
keep this categorisation in mind when considering the appropriateness of developments to 
passing off because they should be consistent with passing off's classification as a tort. 
  
13  Halsbury's Laws of England, above n 3, para 166, 97. 
14  Halsbury's Laws of England, above n 3, para 166, 98. 
15  Hall v Barrows (1863) 4 De GJ & Sm 150, 158 per Lord Westbury LC. 
16  Hall v Barrows, above n 15, 158 per Lord Westbury LC. 
17  Spalding v Gamage [1915] 32 RPC 273, 283 (HL) per Lord Parker. 
18  See below, Part III D. 
19  R F V Heuston & R A Buckley Salmond & Heuston on the law of Torts (21 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 1996) 382. 
20  See below, Part III D. 
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B The Protection Provided by Passing Off 
An action for passing off enables traders to prevent their rivals from deceiving 
consumers that there is a connection between their products. This protection is based on 
the plaintiff's property which is the goodwill connected with the mark, name or get-up 
rather than the mark, name or get-up itself.22 Goodwill has been defined as "the benefit 
and advantage of the good name, reputation and connection of a business…the attractive 
force which brings in custom."23 Passing off allows plaintiffs to prevent any 
misappropriation of their goodwill that results in deception of consumers. Passing off is an 
economic tort; it provides protection against economic loss.24 
C Classic Passing Off 
Classic passing off protects the badge of origin function of a mark thus consumers must 
associate the disputed mark with the plaintiff.25 This association is called goodwill, it is a 
distinct reputation in the mark that distinguishes the product as the plaintiff's product. 
Passing off requires damage. This can be diversion of trade26 or dilution of goodwill.27 
Diversion of trade occurs when consumers buy the defendant's product believing it is the 
plaintiff's. Dilution of goodwill occurs when consumers who buy the defendant's product 
believing it is the plaintiff's are so disappointed with the product that the plaintiff's 
goodwill loses value. 
D Extended Passing Off  
Extended passing off protects goodwill associated with descriptive and geographical 
terms. It allows a class of traders to prevent their rivals from incorrectly applying a 
descriptive term which the plaintiffs apply correctly. Extended passing off goodwill 
requires clearly identified distinctive and recognisable characteristics associated with the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
21  Heuston & Buckley, above n 19; Margaret R Brazier Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (17 ed, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 1995); Todd, above n 2; R P Meagher, W M C Gummow & J R F Lehane Equity 
Doctrines & Remedies (3 ed, Butterworths, Sydney, 1992). 
22  Reddaway v Banham [1896] AC 199, 209; Heuston & Buckley, above n 19, 382. 
23 IRC v Muller & Co's Margarine Ltd [1901] AC 217, 223-224 per Lord Macnaghten, quoted in: W V H 
Rogers Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (15 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1998) 670. 
24  Francis Trindade & Peter Cane The Law of Torts in Australia (3 ed, Oxford University Press, 
Melbourne, 1999) 190. 
25  Clerk & Lindsall on Torts, above n 21, 1405. 
26  Reddaway v Banham, above n 22. 
27  Spalding v Gamage, above n 17. 
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product.28 The goodwill is shared by the traders in the class.29 Extended passing off is not 
protection of a mark as a badge of origin, it ensures correct application of the descriptive 
term. 
To succeed in extended passing off the plaintiff's goodwill must be damaged by the 
defendant's incorrect application of the term.30 Traders cannot use extended passing off to 
prevent rivals from applying the descriptive term correctly because this would not damage 
their goodwill. 
Extended passing off differs from classic passing off in two key respects. First, as a 
misrepresentation of origin is not required it protects traders as a class rather than as 
individuals.31 Second, it protects descriptive terms. This does not give monopoly rights in 
the descriptive term because only incorrect application of the term can be prevented. 
E The Elements of a Cause of Action for Passing Off 
The plaintiff must first prove they meet the threshold requirements for passing off 
protection set out by Lord Fraser in Advocaat:32 
 (1) that his business consists of, or includes, selling in England a class of goods to which the 
particular trade name applies; (2) that the class of goods is clearly defined, and that in the 
minds of the public, or a section of the public, in England, that the trade name distinguishes 
that class from other similar goods; (3) that because of the reputation of the goods, there is 
goodwill attached to the name; (4) that he, the plaintiff, as a member of the class of those who 
sell the goods, is the owner of goodwill in England which is of substantial value; (5) that he 
has suffered, or is really likely to suffer, substantial damage to his property in the goodwill by 
reason of the defendants selling goods which are falsely described by the trade name to which 
the goodwill is attached. 
The plaintiff must then prove the defendant's actions sustain a claim of passing off. 
This requires proof of:33 
(1) a misrepresentation, (2) made by a trader in the course of trade, (3) to prospective 
customers of his or ultimate consumers of goods or services supplied by him, (4) which is 
  
28  Advocaat, above n 9, 741, per Lord Diplock. 
29  W V H Rogers Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (15 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1998) 670. 
30  Advocaat, above n 9, 755-756, per Lord Fraser. 
31  Halsbury's Laws of England, above n 3, para 169, 101. 
32  Advocaat, above n 9, 755 – 756, per Lord Fraser. 
33  Advocaat, above n 9, 742, per Lord Diplock. 
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calculated to injure the business or goodwill of another trader (in the sense that this is a 
reasonably foreseeable consequence) and (5) which causes actual damage to a business or 
goodwill of the trader by whom the action is brought or (in a qua timet action) will probably 
do so. 
Deception and damage need not occur in fact; they can be merely likely to occur.34 The 
test for deception is whether a casual and unwary consumer would be deceived.35 The test 
applied is a consumer appropriate for the product's market.36 The entire market need not 
be deceived; a cause of action can be sustained if a substantial section of the market is 
likely to be deceived.37 
F Remedies Available for Passing Off 
1 Interim relief 
Interim injunctions are usually granted to prevent damage occurring while proceedings 
continue.38 This prevents the defendant from continuing with any activities that might 
potentially be passing off. It often puts the defendant in a difficult financial situation. To 
continue trading the product must be rebranded. In time a reputation will develop in the 
new brand and the defendant will not want to revert to the disputed brand. The defendant 
may also go out of business if they have neither the resources to rebrand their product nor 
to continue with legal proceedings. Thus most passing off cases are effectively settled at 
the interim injunction stage.  
2 Final relief 
Final relief for passing off includes damages, an account of profits and a permanent 
injunction. Proof of damage entitles the plaintiff to an award of damages.39 The award is 
generally equal to the loss suffered as a direct consequence of the misrepresentation.40 The 
quantum in each case is determined using principles of remoteness, foreseeability and 
  
34  Advocaat, above n 9, 742, per Lord Diplock. 
35  Singer Manufacturing Co v Loog (1882) 8 App Cas 15, 18. 
36  Margaret Brazier Street on Torts (9 ed, Butterworths, London, 1993) 133; Todd, above n 2, 766. 
37  Halsbury's Laws of England, above n 3, para 187, 115-116. 
38  Trindade & Cane, above n 24, 210. 
39  Spalding v Gamage, above n 17. 
40  Trindade & Cane, above n 24, 209-210. 
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causation.41 There is debate about whether damages can be awarded in cases of 'innocent' 
passing off however most commentators believe only nominal damages will be awarded.42  
The court may allow election of an account of profits made by the defendant when 
passing off.43 This is not allowed in cases of innocent passing off44 and when allowed 
relief is limited to profits made with knowledge of the plaintiff's rights.45  
A permanent injunction stops the defendant's use of the mark, name or get-up 
permanently. It is only issued if the plaintiff shows "that he has suffered injury that cannot 
be properly compensated by damages, or that he will probably suffer such injury."46 This 
is generally easily proved in passing off because damages alone would enable the 
defendant to continue with their deceptive behaviour thus effectively damages alone are a 
license to continue passing off.47 Other final remedies are delivery up or destruction of the 
offending goods.48 These will only be granted if the defendant acted fraudulently and an 
injunction will not provide sufficient relief.49 
III THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EQUITY AND THE LAW 
A Equity 
The early Common Law Courts required actions to be taken in the form of specific 
writs.50 If there was no writ for the circumstances the courts would not give a remedy.51 
Equity was developed to counter this by providing remedies when common law remedies 
were inadequate or non-existent.52  
  
41  Street on Torts, above n 36, 249-255. 
42  Trindade & Cane, above n 24, 209-210; D R Shanahan Australian Law of Trade Marks and Passing Off 
(2 ed, The Law Book Co Ltd, Sydney, 1990) 398. 
43  Trindade & Cane, above n 24, 210. 
44  Shanahan, above n 42, 398. 
45  Spalding v Gamage, above n 17. 
46  Henderson v Radion Corporation Party Ltd (1960) 60 SR (NSW) 576, 594 per Evatt CJ and Myers J 
quoted in Trindade & Cane, above n 24, 210. 
47  Stainforth Ricketson The Law of Intellectual Property (The Law Book Company, Sydney, 1984) 21. 
48  Ricketson, above n 47, 587. 
49  Ricketson, above n 47, 587. 
50  G Dal Pont & D Chalmers Equity and Trusts in Australia and New Zealand (The Law Book 
Company, Sydney, 1996), 2. 
51  Dal Pont & Chalmers, above n 50, 2. 
52  Julie Maxton "Equity Update" (New Zealand Law Society Seminar, October 1993) 2.  
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The Court of Chancery exercised the equitable jurisdiction. Chancery was developed 
from a process of informal application to the King for relief when the common law did not 
provide sufficient relief.53 Petitions would be referred to the Lord Chancellor when:54 
(a) the common law was inadequate or defective (by reason of the restricted variety of writs 
which were available to initiate proceedings before the common law courts); (b) the common 
law remedy of damages was inappropriate or inadequate; and (c) the common law courts 
lacked jurisdiction, for example, over foreign merchants. 
Equity had three jurisdictions. The exclusive jurisdiction was exercised over rights 
which were not recognised at common law, for example trusts.55 The concurrent 
jurisdiction was exercised when the common law also had jurisdiction over the matter, for 
example the granting of an equitable remedy in a situation where common law damages 
were also available.56 The auxiliary jurisdiction was exercised when equity assisted a party 
to an action at common law in establishing their common law rights, for example 
discovery of documents.57 
Equity's power was limited in many ways. In the exclusive jurisdiction only equitable 
remedies were available.58 In its concurrent jurisdiction equity was unable to decide legal 
rights, titles and interests. Equity could only provide remedies once the legal position had 
been decided by the Common Law Courts.59 If common law damages were available 
equitable relief would only be granted if damages were considered inadequate in the 
circumstances.60 
Traditionally equity acted in personam. Judgments focused on the person rather than 
the property.61 The Courts of Equity are courts of conscience thus equitable remedies 
attempted to put right the wrong, rather than to punish the wrongdoer. If it was 
unconscionable for the plaintiff to suffer Equity would intervene to right the wrong by 
  
53  Dal Pont & Chalmers, above n 50, 2. 
54  Dal Pont & Chalmers, above n 50, 2. 
55  John Brunyate (ed) Maitland's Equity (2 ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1949) 20. 
56  Maxton, above n 52, 2. 
57  Brunyate, above n 55, 20. 
58  Maxton, above n 52, 3. 
59  Meagher, Gummow & Lehane, above n 21, 27. 
60  Maxton, above n 52, 3. 
61  Dal Pont & Chalmers, above n 50, 3. 
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restoring the plaintiff to their original position.62 Equitable remedies are discretionary;63 a 
cause of action may be made out but it remains at the court's discretion to grant a remedy. 
The court will only do so if conscience requires it to.64 Equity generally does not consider 
common law notions of remoteness, foreseeability and causation.65 
B Equitable Maxims 
Equity, being based on fairness, applies good conscience when resolving disputes.66 
Equity seeks to find justice on the individual circumstances of each case. General 
principles, called equitable maxims, provide a framework for the determination of justice 
and the resulting exercise of Chancery's equitable discretion.67  
One such maxim is that 'he who comes into equity must come with clean hands'.68 
Thus if a right is established equity will not intervene if the plaintiff's conduct is improper 
due to fraud, misrepresentation or other unconscionable conduct.69 The plaintiff's 
conscience must be clear in relation to the equitable remedy sought. The plaintiff need not 
be completely without fault.70 An example of the clean hands maxim's use is that a 
beneficiary who acquiesces in a breach of trust cannot subsequently sue the trustee in 
respect of that breach.71 The operation of the maxim may also be seen in the denial of the 
presumption of a trust if the trust was implemented to commit fraud.72 
A plaintiff can 'wash' their hands to prevent the court refusing relief.73 To effectively 
do so the situation must be remedied in a manner which shows good conscience.74  
  
62  Meagher, Gummow & Lehane, above n 21, 71. 
63  Dal Pont & Chalmers, above n 50, 10-11. 
64  Meagher, Gummow & Lehane, above n 21, 71. 
65  Maxton, above n 52, 3. 
66  Dal Pont & Chalmers, above n 50, 1. 
67  Margaret Halliwell Equity and Good Conscience in a Contemporary Context (Old Baily Press, London, 
1997) 11. 
68  This maxim was first formulated by Eyre LCB in Dering v Earl of Wincilsea (1787) 1 Cox Eq Cas 318. 
69 Dal Pont & Chalmers, above n 50, 10. 
70  JR Lewis Outlines of Equity (Butterworths, London, 1968) 20-21. 
71  Re Deane (1888) 42 Ch 9. 
72  Gascoigne v Gascoigne [1918] 1 KB 223. 
73  Meagher, Gummow & Lehane, above n 21, 84. 
74  Dal Pont & Chalmers, above n 50, 11. 
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C The Traditional Relationship between Equity and The Law of Torts 
Traditionally equity and the law of torts had an insignificant relationship. Maitland 
wrote:75 
The Court of Chancery kept very clear of the province of crime, and since the province of 
crime and the province of tort overlap, it kept very clear of large portions of the province of 
tort.…Indeed if you will look at your books on tort you will find that on the whole – if we 
except the province of fraud – equity has had little to do with tort, though it has granted 
injunctions to restrain the commission of nuisances and the like. 
Equitable maxims were traditionally relevant in tort only when equitable relief was 
sought. Then equitable maxims were dealt with as follows. First, the court determined 
whether the cause of action was made out referring only to the common law. Once 
satisfied that the cause of action was made out the Court would turn to relief. Equitable 
maxims would be considered only when exercising the discretion to grant equitable relief. 
They were not taken into account when determining a grant of common law relief. In 
passing off evidence of unclean hands would be whether the plaintiff was guilty of 
misrepresentation to the public themselves.76 
D The Fusion of Law and Equity 
The Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 (Imp) altered the relationship between 
equity and the common law. This is commonly known as 'fusion' because it brought the 
Courts of Equity and the Courts of Common Law together into one Supreme Court of 
Judicature. The court was split into various divisions. Each division gained the power to 
grant both common law and equitable remedies.77  
There is debate about the effect of fusion. At one end of the spectrum are those who 
believe the two systems were substantively merged and at the other those who believe that 
generic differences remain between the two systems.78 The view that there was a merger 
of substantive law was propounded by Lord Diplock:79 
The innate conservatism of English lawyers may have made them slow to recognise that by the 
Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 the two systems of substantive and adjectival law 
formerly administered by courts of law and Courts of Chancery … were fused. As at the 
  
75  Brunyate, above n 55, 55. 
76  Ricketson, above n 47, 584. 
77  Dal Pont & Chalmers, above n 50, 6. 
78  Dal Pont & Chalmers, above n 50, 6. 
79  United Scientific Holdings Ltd v Burnley Borough Council [1978] AC 904, 924-925 (HL). 
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confluence of the Rhone and the Soane, it may be possible for a short distance to discern the 
source from which each part of the combined stream came, but there comes a point at which 
this ceases to be possible…the waters of the confluent streams of law and equity have surely 
mingled now. 
This approach was followed in New Zealand by Sir Robin Cooke (as he then was):80 
…for all purposes now material, equity and common law are mingled or merged…a full range 
of remedies should be available as appropriate, no matter whether they originated in common 
law, equity or statute. 
The opposing view is that while the Judicature Act fused jurisdiction substantive 
differences between equity and the law remain. Professor Ashburner wrote "the two 
streams of jurisdiction, though they run in the same channel, run side by side and do not 
mingle their waters."81 In Australia Meagher JA wrote of Lord Diplock's statement "that 
view is so obviously erroneous as to be risible".82 
Those who take the middle ground claim that a merger of substantive law in an all or 
nothing fashion may not have occurred. It is argued that there has been an intermingling 
of common law and equity with both systems borrowing from each other where 
appropriate.83 This is referred to as the orthodox view of fusion in this paper. 
Maxton argues that there are two modern effects of this intermingling.84 Both relate to 
remedies. First, the common law remedy is the primary remedy because equitable 
remedies are only available for legal rights if the legal remedy is inadequate. Second, 
common law remedies are available for equitable rights. The New Zealand courts have 
reiterated many times that they will give whatever remedy they determine appropriate to 
the circumstances of the individual case.85 Thus the orthodox view of the Judicature Act is 
that it unified the jurisdiction of the courts and that it fused the remedies available but may 
not have fused substantive law. 
  
80  Aquaculture Corp v NZ Green Mussel Co Ltd [1990] 3 NZLR 299, 301 (CA) [Aquaculture]. 
81  Ashburner Ashburner's Principles of Equity (2 ed, London, Butterworths, 1933) 23. 
82  GR Mailman & Associates Pty Ltd v Wormald (Aust) Pty Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 80, 99 (CA) per 
Meagher JA. 
83  Dal Pont & Chalmers, above n 50, 8-9. 
84  Maxton, above n 52, 3-7.  
85  Day v Mead [1987] 2 NZLR 443; A-G for UK v Wellington Newspapers Ltd [1988] 1 NZLR 129; 
Aquaculture, above n 80; NZ Land Development Co v Porter [1992] 2 NZLR 462; Mouat v Clark Boyce 
[1992] 2 NZLR 559. 
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The effect of fusion on the relationship between equity and the law of torts is debatable. 
Some would argue that fusion has had no effect on their relationship while others would 
argue that there has been a substantive merger of equity and the law of torts enabling 
consideration of equitable maxims in relation to a cause of action in tort. Those who take 
the middle ground would argue that equity and the law of torts remain largely separate 
bodies of law which overlap only in relation to remedies. They would argue that fusion 
meant that equitable remedies are available in tort if they are appropriate to the 
circumstances of the case. The fusion debate may shed some light on Laddie J's application 
of the clean hands maxim in Chocosuisse.86 
IV APPLICATION OF THE CLEAN HANDS MAXIM IN CHOCOSUISSE 
A Chocosuisse Background 
The first plaintiff, Chocosuisse, is the professional association of Swiss chocolate 
makers. The second plaintiff, Lindt, and the third plaintiff, Suchard, are members of 
Chocosuisse. They brought proceedings for passing off against Cadbury to protect the 
denomination 'Swiss chocolate' from incorrect use. Cadbury marketed a chocolate bar 
under the name 'Swiss Chalet'. The packaging showed the words 'Swiss Chalet' 
superimposed on a background of a snow-capped mountain and a chalet. The packaging 
had the traditional purple Cadbury background, Cadbury logo and 'glass and a half' 
symbol. 'Swiss Chalet' chocolate was made from standard dairy milk chocolate. The 
plaintiffs claimed that Cadbury was passing off their chocolate as Swiss chocolate and 
sought an injunction to prevent this. 
Cadbury argued the plaintiffs had unclean hands because they mislead the public into 
believing chocolate made outside Switzerland was in fact made in Switzerland.87 The 
alleged unclean behaviour was that the plaintiffs had:88  
…used "Swiss", "Switzerland" and alpine illustrations in relation to products not manufactured 
in Switzerland…[and]…By using the Swiss names in relation to chocolate products, …have 
deceived members of the public in the United Kingdom into believing that such products were 
manufactured in Switzerland… 
Cadbury argued that if the claim of passing off was proved the plaintiffs' unclean 
hands debarred them from obtaining relief.89 Cadbury's claim is interesting because it is a 
  
86 See below Part V. 
87  Chocosuisse, above n 10, 22. 
88  Chocosuisse, above n 10, 24. 
89  Chocosuisse, above n 10, 3. 
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claim that unclean hands should prevent the grant of all relief. Thus equity should 
intervene to prevent both the award of equitable relief and the award of damages. 
Traditionally equitable maxims were not relevant to an award of damages. 
B How the Courts Dealt with Cadbury's Claim 
1 Laddie J's approach to the clean hands argument  
Laddie J treated Cadbury's claim unconventionally. Under the heading 'damage' he 
considered both whether the damage element of passing off was made out and his award 
of relief.90 First he considered unclean hands in relation to the damage element of the 
cause of action. He approved early cases which held that a plaintiff whose own use of the 
mark was inherently deceptive could not succeed in an action to prevent passing off.91 
Consistently with Habib Bank Ltd v Habib Bank Zurich AG92 Laddie J held that the cause of 
action fails when it is unconscionable to grant relief the plaintiff would otherwise be 
entitled to.93 
Laddie J applied the clean hands maxim to determine whether the plaintiff's conduct 
was unconscionable thus causing the cause of action to fail. This was application of an 
equitable maxim to the making out of a cause of action in tort. 
Laddie J considered the evidence of the second and third plaintiff's unclean hands and 
held that it was insufficient to make out a defence of unclean hands because the behaviour 
did not make it unconscionable to grant relief. Thus he held the damage element of the 
cause of action to be made out. Laddie J applied the clean hands maxim as a defence to the 
damage element of passing off rather than in the traditional manner as a defence to a grant 
of relief. As Laddie J held that on the facts the defence of unclean hands was not made out 
in relation to the damage element, he did not consider the maxim in relation to the grant of 
remedies.  
Laddie J treated a defence of clean hands as arguable in relation to the damage element 
of passing off.94 He did not cover the threshold issue of whether the clean hands maxim is 
applicable to the law of torts. Following tradition Laddie J should only have considered 
clean hands when exercising his discretion to grant an injunction.  
  
90  As pointed out above in Part III C traditionally courts would consider whether the cause of action 
had been made out independently from their consideration of relief. 
91  Newman v Pinto (1887) 4 RPC 508; Ford v Foster (1872) 7 Ch App 611. 
92  Habib Bank Ltd v Habib Bank Zurich AG  [1981] 2 All ER 650. 
93  Chocosuisse, above n 10, 24. 
94  Chocosuisse, above n 10, 22-27. 
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Laddie J held that a defence of clean hands against extended passing off requires a 
substantial proportion of the class to have behaved unconscionably.95 This is a reasonable 
requirement if a clean hands defence is to be available against a claim for extended passing 
off because the class as a whole may not be responsible for the behaviour of individuals 
members and may even have been unaware of it. If deceptive behaviour does not reduce 
goodwill it is arguable that the entire class should not be punished for the behaviour of a 
few members. To protect their goodwill against future dilution (thus preserving their 
passing off rights) the class as a whole could force those with unclean hands to clean them.  
2 Chocosuisse in the Court of Appeal  
Cadbury appealed Laddie J's decision. Bingham LCJ, Brooke and Chadwick LJJ 
constituted the Court of Appeal. The leading judgment was given by Chadwick LJ, 
Bingham LCJ concurring, Brooke LJ concurred and delivered a separate judgment.96 
The Court of Appeal considered the alleged unclean behaviour of Lindt and Suchard 
when determining the existence of goodwill in the term 'Swiss chocolate'. They did not 
refer specifically to the clean hands maxim in this determination. They held the behaviour 
did not affect the reputation, thus goodwill was made out. The Court of Appeal did not 
discuss whether damage had occurred. The Court of Appeal's treatment of the evidence of 
unclean hands is more appropriate than Laddie J's treatment of this evidence and is the 
key to applying the concept underlying the clean hands maxim to passing off in the 
future.97 
On appeal the clean hands maxim was considered in relation to the availability of 
remedies. Chadwick LJ held that the concept of 'clean hands' was relevant to all relief, 
because both the injunction and damages were equitable relief.98 This amounts to 
approval of the orthodox view that fusion merely mingled jurisdiction. The Court of 
Appeal did not view fusion as enabling them to consider equitable maxims in relation to 
common law relief. The Court considered any unclean behaviour to be no longer relevant 
to an award of relief because sufficient measures had been taken to clean the unclean 
hands. 
  
95  Chocosuisse, above n 10, 27. 
96  Brooke LJ's judgment was a detailed review of the evidence before Laddie J. He concluded by 
accepting Laddie J's findings of fact and concurring with the judgment of Chadwick LJ. For this 
reason Chadwick LJ's judgment has been focused on in this paper. 
97  See below Part V B. 
98  Chocosuisse (CA), above n 10. 
  
 
366 (2001) 32 VUWLR 
While the Court of Appeal affirmed Laddie J's judgment they applied the clean hands 
maxim differently. Laddie J's judgment is however, still important. He is widely regarded 
as the most authoritative judge on intellectual property.99 His judgment will be considered 
good authority, particularly as it was affirmed on appeal thus it will be an important 
consideration for future courts when determining the nature of a defence of clean hands to 
a claim for passing off. 
V CLEAN HANDS AND PASSING OFF 
A Rationale for Passing Off 
Passing off is about protection of property. If Chocosuisse proves they possess 
goodwill in 'Swiss chocolate' this is a property right which they should be able to defend 
against deceptive use by others. Unclean hands should not be relevant to success in 
passing off once the property is established. Failure to succeed in passing off should be 
based on lack of property rather than unconscionable behaviour. Thus the plaintiff's 
unclean hands should be relevant to establishing a protectable property right rather than 
to preventing others from breaching that right once it has been proved. 
B Relevance of Unclean Hands when Proving Distinctiveness 
The plaintiff must prove their mark, name or get-up is sufficiently distinctive of their 
product to distinguish it from other similar products on the market. Goodwill stems from 
this distinctiveness. It is proposed that unclean hands are more relevant to the 
distinctiveness element than the damage element of passing off. Cadbury could have 
argued that Chocosuisse's behaviour reduced the distinctiveness of 'Swiss chocolate' so 
that sufficiently distinctive goodwill no longer existed. The Court of Appeal dealt with the 
plaintiff's behaviour in this way however they held the behaviour had not reduced 
distinctiveness so protectable goodwill remained. 
In Wineworths Group v Comite Interprofessionel du Vin de Champagne100 (Wineworths), the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal considered a similar defence. Wineworths was a passing off 
action taken by the professional association of Champagne makers to prevent use of the 
mark 'Champagne' on bubbly wine in New Zealand that was not made in the Champagne 
region of France in accordance with industry requirements. 
  
99  Before being appointed to the bench Laddie J was in Chambers in Francis Taylor Building, a 
particular set who are regarded as leaders in the Copyright field. His text The Modern Law of 
Copyright and Designs is a leading text. See also the Court of Appeal's comments about his 
authority in Pro Seiben AG v  Carlton Television [1999] 1 WLR 605 (CA). 
100 Wineworths Group v Comite Interprofessionel du Vin de Champagne [1992] 2 NZLR 327 (CA) 
[Wineworths]. 
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In Wineworths it was claimed that the Champagne houses acted unconscionably by 
failing to take all necessary precautions to protect their mark in other jurisdictions. This 
was considered by the Court in determining whether distinctiveness had been so eroded 
that protectable goodwill no longer existed. The Court held that only the New Zealand 
reputation was relevant and while the international actions of the plaintiff could affect the 
New Zealand reputation they had not yet done so thus the defence failed.101 In Chocosuisse 
the alleged unconscionable behaviour occurred in the United Kingdom thus unlike 
Wineworths it was relevant to the reputation considered by the Court. Thus Cadbury could 
have put forward a defence that unconscionable behaviour had reduced the distinctiveness 
of goodwill. This is substantially similar to unclean hands reducing distinctiveness of 
goodwill. 
This approach applies the concept underlying the clean hands maxim, that is, 
unconscionable behaviour can remove a plaintiff's rights and it is consistent with the 
rationale for passing off. The unconscionable behaviour is relevant to whether the property 
right exists rather than whether that right deserves protection. 
A defence of unconscionable behaviour will however often be unsuccessful in passing 
off. Chocosuisse is an example where the defence would be unsuccessful. Although unclean 
behaviour existed the distinctiveness of 'Swiss chocolate' was not diminished thus a 
defence of unconscionable behaviour would be doomed to fail. This will occur in all cases 
where the public is unaware of the plaintiff's unconscionable behaviour. The public will 
still regard the mark, name or get-up as distinctive and thus a defence of unconscionable 
behaviour is redundant in these situations. 
While a defence of unconscionable behaviour may fail in some cases it is proposed that 
this is a just outcome. A plaintiff whose unconscionable behaviour has not yet diminished 
the distinctiveness of their mark should be able to succeed in an action for passing off 
because passing off protects a property right. If the right exists the plaintiff should be 
entitled to protect it against deceptive use by rivals. The defence of unconscionable 
conduct puts them on notice that their mark's distinctiveness, and consequently their 
rights for passing off, are at risk. They can choose either to continue with the 
unconscionable behaviour and risk losing their property right if the distinctiveness is lost 
or to clean their hands and retain their rights. 
In cases of extended passing off where only some members of the class have acted 
unconscionably it would be unjust for all the class to lose their rights when the unclean 
hands of some members have not diminished shared goodwill. This justifies consideration 
of unclean hands in relation to the goodwill element rather than to the damage element of 
  
101 Wineworths, above n 100, 333 per Cooke P. 
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passing off. As Laddie J pointed out the other members of the class may have been 
unaware of the unconscionable behaviour.102 Once they are put on notice of it the 'clean' 
members of the class can take steps to stop incorrect application of the shared mark. This 
may require an action for passing off against those members whose behaviour is 
unconscionable. A cause of action would exist because even members of the class of 
traders entitled to use the mark are not entitled to apply it incorrectly.103 The damage 
element would be satisfied by the likelihood that the misrepresentation would impair the 
distinctiveness of the mark.  
C Relevance of Unclean Hands to the Quantum of Damages 
Traditionally the clean hands maxim was only relevant to the discretion to grant 
equitable remedies. Typically in tort if liability for the loss is shared between plaintiff and 
defendant the defendant can claim contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff and 
the court will apportion damages accordingly.104 Contributory negligence is not available 
to a defendant in passing off because it is an economic tort.105 This explains why it is 
desirable to use the clean hands maxim to take the plaintiff's behaviour into account when 
determining the quantum of damages. 
Equitable remedies traditionally operated in an all or nothing fashion; unclean hands 
meant the plaintiff would not be granted an equitable remedy.106 The remedy would not 
be reduced in proportion to the plaintiff's behaviour. Recent New Zealand decisions have 
not followed this tradition rather they have borrowed from contributory negligence and 
apportioned liability when the plaintiff was partly liable for the loss.107  
Apportionment of liability for losses is discussed in Day v Mead, and Mouat v Clark Boyce. In 
both decisions the Court of Appeal held that compensation otherwise recoverable for breach of 
fiduciary duty could be reduced to reflect the plaintiff's responsibility for the loss. In so 
holding the Court seemed to modify the traditional equitable rules of restitutionary 
compensation. 
  
102 Chocosuisse, above n 10, 27. 
103 Chocosuisse, above n 10, 6. 
104 Heuston & Buckley, above n 19, 489-490. 
105 Rogers Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (14 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1994) 177, see footnote 17. 
106 Dal Pont & Chalmers, above n 50, 10. 
107 Maxton, above n 52, 7; Day v Mead [1987] 2 NZLR 443; Mouat v Clark Boyce [1992] 2 NZLR 559. 
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This is a result of developments since fusion.108 It shows the court's willingness to 
borrow ideas from tort to use in equity.  
Based on the views of Lord Diplock and the New Zealand Courts109 it is submitted that 
the distinction between legal and equitable remedies is no longer required. This approach 
is supported by Maxton who writes that in New Zealand "it may well be more appropriate 
to suggest that damage rules common to all causes of action are evolving."110 
Consequently it was unnecessary for Chadwick LJ to claim that the damages for passing 
off were equitable to take clean hands into account when determining their quantum.111 
Thus despite passing off being an economic tort, fusion enables the principles of 
contributory negligence to be applied when determining the quantum of damages by 
using the clean hands maxim. 
In fact scenarios similar to Chocosuisse where a property right exists it is proposed that 
the plaintiff should be entitled to an injunction to prevent loss of that right regardless of 
their unclean hands. The plaintiff should then be given an opportunity to clean their hands 
while the goodwill remains intact.  
While proof of a property right should result in an automatic injunction it is proposed 
that the court should consider unclean hands when determining the quantum damages to 
award because it would be inconsistent to award damages for loss caused by the 
defendant's misrepresentations if some members of the plaintiff class also made 
misrepresentations. A plaintiff with unclean hands should not profit from the deceptive 
conduct of others. This may result in a reduction of damages or no award at all.  
D Unclean Hands and Consumer Protection 
Some may argue that the historical equitable basis of passing off justifies the 
consideration of clean hands to the damage element in order to ensure consumer 
protection however this cannot be sustained because passing off is now categorised as a 
tort. The law of torts makes the moral wrongdoer pay for damage they have caused.112 
The focus is responsibility for loss, not the needs of victims. Passing off can be 
distinguished from other torts because there are two groups of victims. The first group are 
the traders whose goodwill has been misappropriated; they are protected by passing off. 
  
108 Maxton, above n 52, 7. 
109 See above, Part III D. 
110 Maxton, above n 52, 6. 
111 Chocosuisse (CA), above n 10. 
112 Todd, above n 2, 15. 
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The second group are the consumers deceived by the defendant's misrepresentations. 
Consumers are not directly protected by passing off. Acceptance of the unclean hands 
defence to remedy the loss suffered by deceived consumers is attempting to use the tort of 
passing off to meet the needs of victims however this is not the focus of tort liability. 
Acceptance of the unclean hands defence is arguable to prevent misleading behaviour 
by all traders. If unclean hands would cause loss of passing off rights traders will strive not 
to behave unconscionably. A successful unclean hands defence means both plaintiff and 
defendant have behaved unconscionably. Both parties are moral wrongdoers, both are 
responsible for loss suffered by the deceived consumers and therefore both should be 
liable. Thus plaintiffs who deceive consumers should be denied protection against passing 
off.  
This consumer protection argument appears to support distinguishing passing off from 
other torts to allow a clean hands defence once passing off rights have been established but 
on closer analysis it is clear that this defence would not provide any remedy to deceived 
consumers. Plaintiffs with unclean hands would refrain from taking an action for passing 
off because they will be punished by the court. This would result in even less protection 
for consumers as both parties will continue to deceive them. 
Consumer protection is also inconsistent with the rationale for passing off. While 
consumers are victims of the deceptive trading passing off does not attempt to protect 
them because it protects property. Consumers do not have property in the use of trade 
names. It is inconsistent for passing off to attempt to protect consumers.  
It is submitted that consumer protection should be considered under consumer 
protection laws. In New Zealand and Australia consumer protection measures would have 
been a viable alternative for Chocosuisse to use to prevent Cadbury using the 'Swiss 
Chalet' brand. In New Zealand the Fair Trading Act 1986 provides consumers with 
protection against deceptive trade practices. Section nine states: 
9. Misleading and Deceptive Conduct Generally – No person shall, in trade, engage in 
conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive. 
In Wineworths the Court of Appeal held that section nine could be used by rival traders 
to stop deceptive conduct and that they would not be required to prove damage to their 
goodwill in order to succeed.113 Similar use of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 has 
also been upheld.114 The remedy is based on public deception rather than protection of 
  
113 Wineworths, above n 100, 333 per Cooke P. 
114 Hornsby Building Information Centre Pty Ltd v Sydney Building Information Centre Ltd (1978) 140 CLR 
216. 
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goodwill.115 Thus both plaintiff and defendant would be prevented from continuing with 
deceptive practices. 
Allowing rival traders a cause of action under consumer protection legislation provides 
consumers with more complete protection than a clean hands defence to passing off. The 
rival trader is more likely than consumers to be aware of deceptive practices and to be in a 
better financial position to take an action under section nine. Thus in New Zealand and 
Australia it is inappropriate for passing off to be extended to allow a defence of clean 
hands to improve consumer protection.  
When, as is often the case, both passing off and the Fair Trading Act are pleaded 
passing off remedies may conflict with those available for breach of the Fair Trading Act. It 
has been proposed that a successful cause of action for passing off should result in an 
automatic injunction while Fair Trading Act remedies require both plaintiff and defendant 
to mend their deceptive practices. These remedies need not be inconsistent. If both are 
pleaded and there is a successful unclean hands defence to remedies then the injunction 
should be conditional on the plaintiff cleaning their hands. This satisfies the rationale of 
both passing off and the Fair Trading Act. 
E Conclusion on Clean Hands and Passing Off 
Laddie J's use of the clean hands maxim does not sit well with the law of passing off. 
Passing off protects a property right which once established should not be denied. The 
concept may however be relevant if applied differently. If the unclean behaviour has 
diminished the distinctiveness of the mark thus destroying the property protected by 
passing off, passing off rights will cease to exist. Following the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal the plaintiff's unconscionable behaviour should be evidence to deny the 
distinctiveness of goodwill. Unclean hands will then be relevant to whether the right to 
pursue remedies for passing off exists. This is more appropriate than considering clean 
hands in relation to making out the damage element of passing off. 
If distinctive goodwill is proved the plaintiffs should be entitled to injunctive relief to 
preserve their goodwill. They should not however, be automatically entitled to damages. 
The clean hands maxim should be relevant to the quantum of damages. This is justified by 
the fusion of law and equity.  
Consumer protection motives should not be considered in passing off and are not a 
viable justification for use of a clean hands defence. Consumer protection is more 
appropriately dealt with by consumer protection laws. Thus New Zealand and Australian 
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courts should not adopt Laddie J's alterations to the law of passing off in an attempt to 
increase consumer protection. 
VI 'EXTENDED EXTENDED' PASSING OFF  
To satisfy the goodwill element of passing off the plaintiff must prove the mark has a 
distinctive reputation that distinguishes their product from others on the market. Both the 
High Court and the Court of Appeal in Chocosuisse lowered the distinctiveness standard 
for protectable goodwill. This section discusses the ramifications of this. 
A Goodwill in Extended Passing Off 
The early extended passing off cases, Spanish Champagne and Advocaat, required the 
plaintiff's mark, name or get-up to be associated with recognised and distinctive qualities 
to have protectable goodwill. This required a precise definition of the distinctive 
characteristics, the product that the mark was protected in relation to and the class of 
traders entitled to use the mark.116  
B Chocosuisse Goodwill 
In Chocosuisse Laddie J defined the requisite distinctiveness for goodwill in a different 
manner. This definition was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. Laddie J held that 
distinctiveness requires a descriptive term "used in relation to a reasonably identifiable 
group of products which have acquired a perceived distinctive quality"117 (emphasis 
added). Laddie J held that the distinctive characteristic of 'Swiss chocolate' is that the 
chocolate is made in Switzerland in accordance with Swiss food regulations.118 
This definition is inconsistent with the Advocaat requirement for precision of definition. 
It was recognised in Chocosuisse that the requirement that the chocolate be made in 
accordance with Swiss food regulations allowed vast differences in composition and 
quality. It was also recognised that this was a broader definition than required to protect 
Chocosuisse products. Thus the requirement of manufacture in accordance with Swiss 
food regulations was unsubstantive. Laddie J's protection of goodwill in the term 'Swiss 
chocolate' is related merely to the origin of the product.  
  
116 Advocaat, above n 9, 747 per Lord Diplock. 
117 Chocosuisse, above n 10, 9. 
118 The Swiss food regulations are not extensive enough to ensure that the chocolate is made in a 
particular way. They require that it has at least 25% cocoa solid content and they allow up to 5% 
vegetable fat. The plaintiffs claimed that Swiss chocolate contains no vegetable fat other than 
cocoa fat despite other fats being allowed under the regulations. 
  
 
 CHOCCOSUISEE – THE NEW 'EXTENDED EXTENDED' PASSING OFF 373 
Laddie J accepted a vague impression that Swiss chocolate is a luxury good as 
sufficient distinctiveness to establish goodwill. He did not require a common 
understanding of the distinctive qualities. Sufficient goodwill existed because a substantial 
number of people believed that 'Swiss chocolate' was somehow different to and of a higher 
quality than other chocolate although their reasons for this belief differed vastly. 
In passing off, the fact of copying is often said to imply the existence of goodwill.119 
This may explain Laddie J's findings. If Cadbury did not believe the 'Swiss Chalet' brand 
would draw in custom they would not have used it. The function of goodwill is its ability 
to draw in custom. Thus Cadbury's use of the name 'Swiss Chalet' is arguably proof that 
'Swiss chocolate' has recognisable goodwill. 
It is submitted that a reputation for luxury alone is insufficient because the protected 
product, the protected reputation and the protected class of traders are all difficult to 
determine. Laddie J's judgment signals a broadening of the tort of passing off by making 
protection more readily available for descriptive terms.120 This may cause many 
difficulties. 
C The Problems Created by Chocosuisse Distinctiveness 
1 Lack of precise definition of distinctive characteristics 
Laddie J did not require a distinct definition of the distinctive characteristics of 'Swiss 
chocolate'. There was no evidence that the reputation was associated with distinct 
ingredients or processes. It would seem that any trader who made chocolate in 
Switzerland in accordance with Swiss food regulations falls within the class. A 
manufacturer could set up business in Switzerland, making an inferior product without 
the allure of luxury that current Swiss chocolate has. The existing Swiss traders could not 
prevent application of the term 'Swiss chocolate' to this product because the new trader 
would fulfill Laddie J's definition despite not having the reputation for luxury that is 
protected in Chocosuisse. If the new trader applies 'Swiss chocolate' to their product the 
term may lose its reputation and become generic. The original Swiss chocolate makers will 
lose their passing off rights. As extended passing off protects a class of traders it is 
important to have a discrete definition of the distinctive characteristics of goodwill 
otherwise future courts may have difficulty determining both the protected product and 
those who fall within the class of traders entitled to apply the mark to their product. 
  
119 Todd, above n 2, 762. 
120 Giles Fernando "Passing Off – Swiss Chocolate" (1999) 21 EIPR 128, 130. 
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2 Perceived distinctive characteristics 
Laddie J also lowered the distinctiveness threshold by allowing distinctive 
characteristics to be perceived rather than factual. Laddie J pointed out that to hold 
otherwise would be to treat classic and extended passing off differently.121 While it may be 
preferable to treat classic and extended passing off in the same manner they are actually 
different causes of action thus it is inappropriate to apply the same test to both. It is 
inherent in the nature of extended passing off that the characteristics of the product are 
actually recognisable and distinctive. To hold otherwise would allow a class of traders 
monopoly rights over a descriptive term that does not accurately describe their product. 
Traders holding a such monopoly should be required to apply the term accurately. Laddie 
J himself states that passing off protects the "accuracy and exclusivity of the descriptive 
term".122 To allow protection for an inaccurate perception, rather than actual distinctive 
characteristics is contradictory to the aim of extended passing off to protect correct 
application of descriptive terms. 
In determining the perceived distinctive characteristics of 'Swiss chocolate' Laddie J 
allowed goodwill to be recognised while acknowledging conflicting evidence of perceived 
distinctive characteristics. While all consumers need not be able to define the specific 
characteristics of goodwill those characteristics ought however be defined consistently by 
the consumers who do have knowledge of them.  
For example in Wineworths there was evidence from a group of trade consumers who as 
group defined the distinctive characteristics of Champagne consistently. In Chocosuisse 
there was only evidence from one trader, the purchaser for Marks and Spencer's, who gave 
evidence that 'Swiss chocolate' had a reputation for luxury. She did not give evidence as to 
its composition nor the processes used in its production. The characteristic that she 
identified that gave 'Swiss chocolate' its reputation was merely that it was a premium 
product made in Switzerland.123 This 'trade' definition does not possess the accuracy of 
the trade definition in Wineworths. Without an accurate trade definition of actual 
distinctive characteristics of the goodwill being protected it is important that general 
consumers' beliefs about the qualities that constitute goodwill are consistent. Without this 
consistency it is impossible to determine exactly what is protected. In Chocosuisse there was 
no such consistency of belief.  
  
121 Chocosuisse, above n 10, 9. 
122 Chocosuisse, above n 10, 7. 
123 Chocosuisse, above n 10, 12-13 
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3 Reasonably identifiable products 
Laddie J allowed 'Swiss chocolate' to be protected in relation to a reasonably identifiable 
group of products. In Advocaat Lord Diplock required the product that the goodwill 
applied to be precisely defined because:124 
…if one can define with reasonable precision the type of product that has acquired the 
reputation, one can identify the members of the class entitled to share in the goodwill … 
To be truly distinctive the product itself must have a distinct composition that can be 
precisely defined.  
The reasonableness standard in Chocosuisse is unjustified as it makes it difficult to 
determine the products in relation to which the mark is protected. The injunctive remedy 
provided in successful passing off cases is a severe fetter on the defendant trader's right to 
compete. To obtain this advantage the plaintiff's goodwill should encompass more than a 
reasonably identifiable group of products; those products should be actually identifiable. If 
this is not required the plaintiff class will gain much broader protection than necessary. 
D Conclusion on 'Extended Extended' Passing Off 
Laddie J's distinctiveness requirement for protectable goodwill has lowered the 
threshold for passing off protection in many ways. He allowed a general idea of luxury 
rather than a discrete definition of distinctive characteristics to be sufficient for extended 
passing off goodwill. He allowed the distinctiveness to be perceived rather than actual and 
did not even require a standard perception of distinctiveness. He also required the term to 
be distinctive only in relation to a reasonably identifiable group of products. Laddie J's 
definition makes it easier to gain extended passing off protection and extends the 
protection afforded by passing off thus creating 'extended extended' passing off. This 
definition will cause problems for future traders and courts because it will be difficult to 
determine precisely which products and which traders are protected. 
VII USE OF PASSING OFF TO PROTECT GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATORS 
A Passing Off's Traditional Treatment of Geographical Indicators 
In the past the courts have avoided using passing off to protect geographical indicators. 
Geographical terms are part of the public domain; every trader should have the right to 
indicate the geographical origin of their goods.125 Traditionally to gain passing off 
  
124 Advocaat, above n 9, 747 per Lord Diplock.  
125 Thomas Heilbling "The Term 'Swiss' on Trade Goods: A Denomination of Origin and its Legal 
Protection in the United Kingdom" (1997) 19 EIPR  51, 51. 
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protection for a geographical term a trader was required to prove that the term had 
acquired a secondary meaning that distinguished their product from others on the market. 
Laddie J's definition of the goodwill in 'Swiss chocolate' protected a geographical term 
that did not have such a secondary meaning. His definition is chocolate made in 
Switzerland in accordance with Swiss food regulations which effectively means chocolate 
made in Switzerland because generally chocolate made in Switzerland will be made in 
accordance with Swiss food regulations.126 His definition protects accurate use of the 
geographical indicator 'Swiss'. Laddie J says "prime facie, Swiss chocolate means chocolate 
made in Switzerland."127 This is use of passing off to protect correct application of a 
geographical indicator. 
Commentaries discuss the Champagne cases as examples of the use of passing off to 
protect a mark descriptive of origin.128 This is inaccurate. While one element of 
'Champagne' is its origin there are other elements associated with the term. Together these 
elements gave 'Champagne' its distinctive reputation. The Champagne cases are not 
authority for the proposition that extended passing off enables protection of geographical 
indicators. 
B Use of Passing Off to Protect Accurate Application of Geographical Indicators 
Laddie J held that descriptive terms which indicate "nothing about the goods in respect 
of which they are used save that they come from a particular geographical location"129 will 
not be afforded passing off protection. He gave the examples 'French ball-bearings' and 
'Italian pencils'.130 However the term 'Swiss chocolate' is indistinguishable from 'French 
ball-bearings' and 'Italian pencils' because it indicates nothing about the product other than 
its place of origin. Laddie J's identifier that the chocolate be made in accordance with Swiss 
food regulations does not distinguish it. The Swiss food regulations set a lower standard 
than that complied with by Chocosuisse members. It is possible that Cadbury's chocolate 
was made in accordance with Swiss food regulations. Thus the distinction between 
Chocosuisse chocolate and Cadbury's 'Swiss Chalet' chocolate was merely their location of 
manufacture. What is more, if there were domestic regulations for manufacture of 'French 
ball-bearings' and 'Italian pencils' consumers in the United Kingdom would assume that 
  
126 Ensuring Swiss products are made in compliance with Swiss food regulations is the role of the 
Swiss authorities rather than the British courts. 
127 Chocosuisse, above n 10, 15. 
128 James, above n 8, 323; Halsbury's Laws of England, above n 3, para 185, 114. 
129 Chocosuisse, above n 10, 10. 
130 Chocosuisse, above n 10, 10. 
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the products had been made in accordance with those regulations. By protecting the term 
'Swiss chocolate' Laddie J extended passing off protection to geographical indicators.  
C Protection of Geographical Indicators is Inconsistent with Passing Off Rationale 
Protection of geographical indicators is an inappropriate use of passing off. While 
extended passing off does protect correct application of descriptive terms it only does so 
when there is protectable goodwill associated with the term that distinguishes the product 
from others on the market. 
Laddie J's decision may create a problematic precedent. While it is simple to see that 
the geographical term 'Swiss' can be easily defined in relation to the geographical region of 
Switzerland, there may be problems when this precedent is applied to geographical terms 
that do not describe clearly defined areas. This will be particularly problematic when the 
geographical term in question accurately describes more than one area. For example the 
term 'Canterbury'. Both the United Kingdom and New Zealand have a region called 
Canterbury. If passing off protection was extended to the term 'Canterbury wool' in 
relation to wool products from the Canterbury in the United Kingdom wool products from 
Canterbury in New Zealand would be prevented from using the mark 'Canterbury wool' 
despite it being a correct application of the geographical indicator. This is an unsatisfactory 
outcome. 
D Alternative Methods to Enforce Correct Use of Geographical Indicators 
1 The Trade Descriptions Act 
In Chocosuisse Laddie J held that wrongful application of a geographical indicator 
would be a breach of the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 (UK) however this Act does not give 
rise to a civil cause of action.131 The Trade Descriptions Act has to be enforced by domestic 
prosecution. Even if Chocosuisse could convince the British authorities to undertake such a 
prosecution it is unlikely to be successful because Cadbury's packaging stated that the 
chocolate was made in the United Kingdom thus the only course open to Chocosuisse to 
protect their geographical indicator within the British system was passing off.  
2 The World Trade Organisation Dispute Settlement Body 
(a) TRIPs article 22 
While passing off was the only mechanism available to Chocosuisse within the British 
system there was another option outside the British system. TRIPs requires member states 
to provide means for interested parties to prevent misapplication of geographical 
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indicators.132 The United Kingdom had not yet complied with this obligation so 
Switzerland had a valid complaint which it could have taken to the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body. 
Article 22 of TRIPs requires that:133 
…In respect of geographical indications, Members shall provide the legal means for interested 
parties to prevent: 
(a) the use of any means in the designation or presentation of a good that indicates or suggests 
that the good in question originates in a geographical area other than the true place of origin in 
a manner which misleads the public as to the geographical origin of the good; 
Chocosuisse is an article 22 interested party. Thus the United Kingdom ought to 
provide means for them to ensure correct application of the geographical indicator 'Swiss'. 
While the United Kingdom has not complied with this requirement, New Zealand has 
implemented the Geographical Indications Act 1994 to fulfill their TRIPs obligation. The 
New Zealand Act is however not yet in force because it is too difficult to determine the 
boundaries of geographical regions in respect of specific products. Although it is relatively 
easy to define the boundaries of geographical regions of states the obligation also applies 
to geographical indicators of smaller regions. Problems arise when attempting to define 
these regions. The difficulty is increased because the boundaries may differ depending on 
the product in relation to which the geographical indicator is used. Despite these 
difficulties the United Kingdom's failure to comply with their obligations under TRIPs to 
provide means for interested parties to prevent incorrect use of geographical indicators is a 
breach of TRIPs Article 22. 
(b) The WTO dispute settlement process 
Disputes over compliance with TRIPs are settled under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)134 provisions for dispute settlement.135 This is settlement by the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body.136 Thus to enforce compliance with article 22 Chocosuisse 
could have taken a dispute to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. This is not an easy 
process and may not have effectively solved the problem faced by Chocosuisse. 
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Only a member state can take a dispute against another member state to the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body.137 Thus Chocosuisse could not take the dispute themselves; the 
Swiss authorities would have to take the dispute on their behalf. Matters are further 
complicated because as a member of the European Union, the United Kingdom is not 
individually represented at the WTO. Switzerland would have to take the European Union 
to the Dispute Settlement Body. In turn the European Union would then require the 
Dispute Settlement Panel's findings to be enforced in the United Kingdom. This is an 
extremely indirect process.  
In addition to these difficulties the Dispute Settlement Panel has no power to stop use 
of the offending term while the dispute is settled. Thus during the settlement process 
Cadbury would still have been able to use the 'Swiss Chalet' mark. If the Dispute 
Settlement Body held in favour of Switzerland, further time would be allowed for the 
United Kingdom to remedy the breach of TRIPs.138 This would enable further erosion of 
the reputation of Swiss chocolate. 
The WTO has no power to enforce Dispute Settlement Panel findings so the United 
Kingdom would not be bound its findings. If they failed to comply with the findings 
Switzerland could impose retaliative sanctions.139 Thus, even if successful at the WTO, 
Chocosuisse might not obtain the protection they desire. These problems make it 
understandable why Chocosuisse chose to take an action for passing off instead of 
attempting to seek resolution through WTO mechanisms.  
While the practical reality makes it understandable that Chocosuisse chose not to take 
the dispute to the WTO this would theoretically have been a more appropriate method of 
dealing with the problem because protection of geographical indicators is inconsistent with 
the rationale of passing off. Chocosuisse effectively extends passing off to provide the 
protection required by TRIPs. As one text points out "the common law has in effect 
produced something akin to the system of appellation controlee protection."140 It is 
submitted that this is not an appropriate extension to passing off because it takes the 
protection afforded beyond the justifications of passing off. Passing off protects traders' 
property in their goodwill; it does not prevent deceptive use of geographical indicators. 
The protection required by TRIPs should be provided by legislative measures. It is a matter 
that should properly be debated by parliament. It should not be up to judges to determine 
the contentious issue of geographical boundaries.  
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VIII CONCLUSION 
Laddie J's judgment in Chocosuisse has pushed the boundaries of extended passing off 
beyond its traditional rationale. The ramifications of this may cause significant alteration to 
the law of passing off. Future courts should thus take caution before applying Laddie J's 
extensions to passing off. 
Laddie J applied the clean hands maxim in a unique manner. His consideration of the 
clean hands maxim as a defence to the damage element of passing off is both unorthodox 
and unjustifiable. The concepts underlying the clean hands maxim can be applied more 
appropriately to passing off by considering them in relation to the distinctiveness element 
of passing off. This could take the form of a defence of unconscionable behaviour. Fusion 
of equity and the law has been widely accepted to have caused fusion of remedies thus on 
proof of a passing off there should be automatic entitlement to an injunction and clean 
hands should be a relevant to the quantum of damages. Passing off is not the appropriate 
forum for consumer protection measures. A clean hands defence should not be allowed in 
an attempt to ensure consumer protection which is more appropriately dealt with by 
consumer protection legislation.  
Laddie J created 'extended extended passing off' by lowering the distinctiveness 
standard for goodwill in extended passing off. Future courts ought not follow Laddie J's 
lead in this area because his findings mean in the future it will be much easier for plaintiffs 
to prove goodwill in extended passing off cases which may lead to plaintiffs obtaining a 
broad monopoly over descriptive terms that the plaintiffs themselves may not apply 
correctly. It will be difficult for future courts to determine with precision the protected 
reputation, the product in relation to which the reputation is protected and the protected 
class of traders.  
The definition of goodwill in Chocosuisse protects a mere geographical indicator. 
Passing off has avoided affording this protection in the past. Chocosuisse may create a 
problematic precedent when applied to regional geographical terms. An alternative course 
is to take a dispute to the WTO over breach of TRIPs obligations. While theoretically this is 
a more appropriate course as it would encourage implementation of legislation to protect 
geographical indicators the practical realities of the WTO dispute settlement process make 
it an unattractive option for plaintiffs. This type of protection however does not fit well 
with passing off and is more appropriately dealt with by legislation. Passing off should not 
be extended in this manner. 
The potential of Laddie J's judgment to alter the law of passing off is vast. Whether or 
not courts in the future will adopt Laddie J's far reaching changes remains to be seen. 
